Using this definition, most health care systems in the Western w orld w ill probably be two, or m ultiple, tier systems. W hat is im portant, however, is to assess the content of the difference by asking questions such as the following. Are the costs of utilization of all services, except the extra costs of first-class hospitalization, covered by compulsory insurance? Are services such as in vitro fer tilization and plastic surgery excluded from reimbursement? Are co-payments required for urinary incontinence material?
Because of differences such as these, health care systems can be tw o, or m ultiple, tier systems to different degrees. Further, they evolve and develop, becoming more or less strongly a two, or m ultiple, tier system.
B. Evidence for the Alluded Transition of the Dutch Health Care System
Two types of evidence w ill substantiate the thesis that the health care system in the Netherlands is becoming a two, or m ultiple, tier system. 1) Intentions for health care reform that have been p u b licly communicated, either by the Dutch government itself or by committees installed by the government. These intentions have as yet not been fully implemented and are still the subject of m uch controversy. 2) Actual changes which have already taken place in both the organization and the financing of health care services, thereby leading to stronger diversification. C. Intentions for Health Care Reform D urin g the past few years, the Dutch government has tried to re form the financing and organizations of the health care system and to gain broader social support for such reforms, w ith only partial success. Presently, two major types of health care insurance exist in The Netherlands. Those with an annual income below D fl 56,000, approximately 62% of the population, have compulsory health care insurance. Their entitlements are laid down by law. The executing organizations are local sick funds, and premiums are, to a large extent, income dependent. Insurees in this category have little freedom to choose between different levels of coverage and only very recently was the possibility created to choose among different levels of personal risk (Minutes of the Parliament 23 567, nrs. [1] [2] [3] [1993] [1994] . Those with an annual income above D fl 56,000, approx im ately 38% of the population, are free to decide whether they w ish to purchase private health care insurance. By far, most of them have private insurance. Premiums are not income dependent, and there is m uch more freedom to choose between more or less exten sive coverage and to choose a level of personal risk. The general impression is that people receive the same care, irrespective of their mode of insurance. Im portantly, however, remuneration for health care providers differs, depending u p o n the mode of insur ance of their patients. W hile the government wishes to create a single, compulsory basic health care insurance for all, insurance premiums affect health care options. Premiums should be income dependent, b u t in other respects this basic health insurance should more closely resemble current private health insurance, w ith the possibility to opt for more or less extensive coverage, various levels of personal risk etc. In view of this policy objective, the question is: W hich benefits should be included in the basic benefits package? It was the task of the government committee Choices in Health Care to answer this question.
D. The Government Committee on Choices in Health Care
The government committee Choices in Health Care, chaired by Pro fessor D unning, a cardiologist, was asked to develop criteria to distinguish between basic and non-basic health care (Choices in Health Care, 1992) . For basic health care, a compulsory health care insurance was envisaged, w ith the costs of non-basic health care services covered by voluntary supplementary insurance or p aid out-of-pocket. Clearly, adoption of such a scheme w ould create a two tier system. The committee suggested that basic services should meet each of the follow ing criteria: 1) the service should be neces sary from a societal perspective; 2) the effectiveness and efficiency of the service should be sufficiently demonstrated; and, 3) the costs should be such that they cannot be reasonably expected to be borne by the individual. O n the basis of these criteria, the commit tee argued that services such as in vitro fertilization, physiother apy, homeopathic drugs, and dental care for people aged 19 years or more do not qualify as basic care and should not be financed through income dependent prem ium s for compulsory health care insurance.
E. A Second Criterion: Insurability
The government committee Choices in Health Care also discussed the aspect of insurability, i.e., whether the financial risks associ ated w ith the utilization of a particular health care service can be insurable if people are free to decide whether or not to have this Towards a Two Tier Health System: How to put Theory into Practice 619 risk covered by their health insurance (Choices in Health Care, 1992) . This insurability depends upon factors such as the m agnitude of the risk, i.e., the number of people at risk and the costs of utilization of services, the predictability of the risk, and whether the value of services can be readily appreciated by non-users. Predictability is high, for example, in the case of genetic pre-dispositions such as cystic fibrosis, Huntington's chorea, Dow n's syndrome etc., and in case o f chronic diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis and Crohn's or Gaucher's disease, for it is known that persons w ith these dis eases w ill continue to make use of certain medical services. The value of services is usually readily appreciated by non-users in the case of life-saving treatment modalities. However, it is often more difficult to appreciate the value of services w hich contribute to quality of life. It is much more difficult for non-users to appre ciate, for instance, the value of speech therapy to patients w ith Parkinson's disease.
Can the financial risk associated with utilization of the service easily be insured? C om bining the criteria of the Choices in Health Care committee w ith the insurability criterion gives rise to four categories of services ( Figure 1 ). These categories of services differ in the sense that they are, to various degrees, the subject of both public and in d iv id u a l responsibility. Services that meet the criteria proposed by the Choices in Health Care committee, but which are difficult to insure, should be entirely shielded from any market mechanism; the pro vision and utilization of these services was considered a prime responsibility of the community, and a prominent regulatory role for the central government was recommended. Services that do not meet the criteria proposed by the government committee, b u t w hich can be easily insured, should be covered by a supplemen tary, voluntary health care insurance or be paid out-of-pocket.
These services are prim arily a matter of in d iv id u a l responsibility, and a market mechanism was considered appropriate as a reg ulative principle. Individual freedom should prevail, and it was deemed acceptable that individuals experience the consequences of their choices, both in monetary terms and in terms of access to services. M ost health care services should be classified in the third category: they meet the criteria of the governm ent committee and are fairly w ell insurable, so that most people w o u ld probably want these risks covered by their health insurance. These services are subject to a mixture of individual and public responsibility. Com pul sory insurance was envisaged for these services, as w ell as managed competition among providers, global budgets for health care purchasing insurance companies, and various levels o f per sonal risk for the insurees. Logically, the criteria give rise to yet another category of services: those that do not meet the criteria of necessity, effectiveness, efficiency and non-affordability, and w hich are difficult to insure. No one has w orried so far about services that belong to this category. For this reason, they w ill not be con sidered. Thus, three categories of services are distinguishable, w ith different mixes of public and private responsibilities.
The government has not fully adopted the recommendations of the committee. Rather, it was decided that adoption of such a system w ould not be feasible on technical grounds and, therefore, opted for a two tier system consisting of a package of basic services whose costs are covered by compulsory insurance w ith income dependent premiums, as distinguished from non-essential services whose costs are covered by voluntary, supplem entary insurance or paid out-of-pocket. This reform is currently being im plemented gradually
F. The Actual Existence of Multiple Tiers in the Dutch Health Care System
Presently, m ultiple tiers exist prim arily for those who are privately insured. This includes both a basic package and the possibility of purchasing supplementary insurance. Insurees can choose among different levels of personal risk, w ith co-payments required for some services. A n explicit policy objective of the D utch govern ment in 1994 was to finance health care through co-payments of at least 15% (Financial Overview Care, 1994) . A n overview is pre sented in Table I w hich distinguishes between: 1) costs of services that are covered by standard private health insurance, in clu d in g Towards a Two Tier Health System: How to put Theory into Practice 621 those instances where discretionary judgm ent of the insurance com pany is required1 and those instances where co-payments are required, and, 2) costs of services for w hich supplem entary insurance can be purchased. The situation is further complicated because some of the costs are covered by yet another arrangement called the AWBZ (General Law Extraordinary Costs of Disease, 1993 Disease, -1994 . However, I w ill not elaborate upon this point further since it is only a temporary arrangement and a detail of the current reform of the Dutch health care system. Sick funds have more of the characteristics of a single tier system where the possibility of choosing among different levels of coverage is less extensive. O nly recently, in its endeavor to merge the two types of insurance, has the government created the same possibility of choosing among different levels of personal risk for those insured by the sick funds, w ith co-payments required for the same services as in the case of private health insurance. Thus, different tiers of health services can be distinguished and, in view of these policy objectives, this development is likely to continue in the near future.
II. IS A TWO, OR MULTIPLE, TIER HEALTH CARE

SYSTEM MORALLY DESIRABLE?
Clearly, a two, or m ultiple, tier health care system rests upon the assumption that not all health care needs and services are equal. There are health care needs and services which have features such that we m ay legitimately expect compliance w ith norms and rules, thereby reflecting institutionalized solidarity. O n the other hand, some health care needs and services have features such that in d i vidual choices and preferences are respected. This raises two ques tions. 1) Is there any evidence for such diversity? 2) If so, in w hat respect does it warrant differentiation in the financing of health care?
A. Evidence for Diversity in Health Care Services
Considerable diversity in health care needs and services exists, and this diversity continues to increase. M ental health care is a case in point. In 1994, the Dutch government reallocated approxi mately D fl 50 m illio n in this sector, taking it away from general mental hospitals and making it available for am bulatory psychi atric care, including da}' care and hom e care, and for projects such as employment rehabilitation (Financial Overview Care, 1994) . The rationale for this process was th at the standard care could no longer adequately meet the needs of those seeking this type of care. Such diversification of care is quite a general phenom enon in Towards a Two Tier Health System: How to put Theory into Practice 623 the health care sector. It indicates that more importance is attrib uted to development and adoption of types of care w hich better suit in d iv id u al preferences. The resulting m ultiplicity of health care services is not compatible w ith a financing scheme that is largely single tiered. If health care services are developed and adopted in order to more adequately meet the in d iv id u a l needs of health care consumers, it is no longer self-evident that the costs associated w ith the utilization of these services should be covered by a single, non-individualized financing system. If we wish to reduce this friction, we can either choose to sanction this develop ment in health care, or try to redress it. Creating a two, or m u lti ple, tier financing system of health care is a way of sanctioning this development. Yet, is it the right thing to do? This brings me to the second question: Do health care services and needs for health care differ in such a way that differentiation in financing is, thereby, warranted?
B. Conflicting Values and Indeterminate Principles
A two, or m ultiple, tier health care system reflects the idea that trade-offs between the requirements of conflicting values such as solidarity and autonomy should be made differently, depending u p o n the features of the health care needs and services. Solidarity reflects, as De Beaufort has said in a background paper for the Choices in Health Care committee, that we know about someone else's well being, that we care about someone else's w ell being, and that we are prepared to take appropriate action (De Beaufort, 1992) . It is close to a feeling of shared responsibility, and the feeling that we are in a position to prevent harm or to change something for the better, and that we not only can do something, but that we should do something. Often, we fail in this respect. First, we should care to know. Yet, in order to know we have to ask, listen, or empathize, and we must feel that we can do something, i.e., that our contribution would make a difference. These conditions some times hold in our private spheres, but in the public sphere things are quite different. There, solidarity is institutionalized by adopt ing compulsory health care insurance schemes and expressing sol idarity between the healthy and the sick and between the rich and the poor. The government is held responsible for establishing and m aintaining such schemes. On the part of the citizen, compliance w ith the norms and rules of such schemes is expected. The question, however is: In which cases can such compliance be legitimately expected? The current debate in The Netherlands indicates that solidarity is not considered unconditional. For example, if someone behaves in a manner of which I strongly disapprove and there is not sufficient basis for dialogue to overcome this difference of opinion, an appeal to solidarity is possibly misplaced, probably ineffective, and may work out inappropriately. The problem is that by stretching solidarity too far, it m ay loose its m eaning altogether. In this respect, the recommendations of the government com mittee Choices in Health Care can be understood as im plying that an appeal to solidarity should be made only in those cases where the four conditions of necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and non affordability hold. These, then, are the relevant features by w hich health care services differ from each other, thereby warranting some differentiation in their financing. But, when is the provision of a health care service necessary from the social perspective? If health care should enable us to participate w ith in society in a norm al way, what does this "norm ality" mean? We could say that the ambiguity or indeterminacy of the principle of solidarity is merely exchanged for the am biguity and indeterminacy of the principle of "necessity from the social perspective." Indeed, the introduction of the four conditions w hich should be met by health care services to qualify as basic care has done little to resolve the question of where the line should be drawn, i.e., w hich services do, and w hich services do not, qualify for public funding. The D utch government has tried to stimulate a public debate on choices in health care (Choices in Health Care, 1992) . This public debate, however, has not gotten off the ground. Indeed, very little has been done to further opera tionalize the criteria of the committee. Thus, although we seem to be fairly capable of identifying relevant criteria and moral princi ples, we have great difficulty in reaching agreement on what follows from these principles in specific cases.
The predicament is by no means an exception. One of the leading philosophers who has contributed to our thinking about justice in health care, Norman Daniels, seems to be retracing his steps. In 1985, his book, Just Health Care, was published (Daniels, 1985) . In this book, Daniels addressed the question of w hat it is that makes the provision of care the appropriate target of collective responsibility and concern. The answer which he suggest is: im pact on an in d i vidual's fair share of the normal opportunity range. Im paired health can reduce this share and, to the extent that health care can either prevent this from happening, restore, or compensate for this, its provision is a collective responsibility. This fair equality of oppor tunity account of justice in health care is consistent w ith a two tier system insofar as health care services w hich do not contribute to this ideal of fair equality of opportunity do not qualify for public funding. However, in his paper presented to the inaugural congress of the International Association for Bioethics, Daniels casts doubt on the practical significance of his account to resolve resource allocation problems in health care (Daniels, 1993) . Specifically, he suggests that his fair equality of opportunity principle m ight be too indeterminate to allow conclusions to be draw n regarding the propriety of the public funding of particular services. A lthough this self-criticism is, perhaps, in itself, laudable, I do not agree w ith it. I agree that there is a problem, but the problem is not the indetermi nacy of the principle.
in . THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY A N D PRACTICE H aving defined one or more principles w hich should enable a dis tinction to be made between basic and non-basic health care ser vices, little progress has been achieved in assessing w hat follows from these principles in specific cases. This results in a striking gap between theory and practice, for there is the report of the govern m ent committee on the one hand, and there are specific decisions on reimbursement involving co-payments for urinary incontinence material, psychotherapy, supplementary insurance needed to cover the costs of speech therapy, physiotherapy etc., on the other. Rarely is there a reference made in these kinds of decisions to these type of principles. Further, when a reference is made, it is in a strictly deductive way. For example, in the case of in vitro fertilization, it is tacitly assumed that we can infer w hat follows from a general principle by deductive reasoning only. The m odel of moral dis course which I recommend is a more hermeneutic, interpretive mode of reasoning which challenges this assumption.
4
A. Casuistry: A Neglected but Valuable Contribution to the Public Debate on Health Care Reform
The hermeneutic model that I recommend was described by Brennan (Brennan, 1977) . It is a formal model of the structure of normative discourse whose moral principles are inherently opentextured insofar as they do not allow for the possibility of defining conditions w hich are both necessary and sufficient for their correct application. M oral principles have this feature in common w ith many other principles, at least the more interesting ones such as legal principles (Gaskins, 1992) . M oral inquiry begins w ith the con jecture that an act is either m orally right, or m orally wrong, for instance because it is an unjustified infringem ent on someone else's autonomy. Brennan calls this the m oral hypothesis. The outcome of this m oral inquiry is a moral judgm ent, i.e., a statement about the truth or falsity of the initial hypothesis. The inquiry consists of stating explicitly those features w hich render the act in question morally wrong and comparing the case w ith other cases know n to be classified by the same principle of respect for autonomy. A central feature of this model is that it is prim arily through knowl edge of particular cases that we come to understand the meaning of the principle, thereby allow ing the identification of certain acts, or situations, as either morally rig ht or wrong. M oral discourse is concerned w ith whether a particular classification is correct, and whether specific similarities, or dissim ilarities, w ith other cases are correctly identified and relevant. W hen agreement is reached on the correctness of a particular classification, this may, though it need not, entail a change in the m eaning of the principle. In Brennan's model, assessing what follows from our commitment to a moral principle in a particular context is called the process of explication. If we fail to reach agreement on the question of whether a particu lar explication is right or not, we can take recourse to the rationale of the principle, i.e., why we should be committed to the principle. The rationale acts as a controlling norm by questioning whether a particular explication is plausible in view of the rationale of the principle. A ny rationale w ill usually be closely linked to some w orld view.
B. Different Levels of Sophistication of Normative Discourse
W ith this model, we can distinguish different level of sophistica tion of normative discourse. These are schematically presented in Figure 2 . In each case, the question is whether a particular health care service, in vitro fertilization, for example, qualifies for public funding.
In [1] , the question is addressed w ithout m aking explicit refer ence to a moral concept that w o u ld serve to guide our decision or judgment. In many debates, arguments are advanced either to support or to challenge the p ublic fu n d in g of this service w ithout explicitly referring to any moral principle.2 For example, there is no reference to the underlying utilitarian concept of justice in the assertion that purchasing in vitro fertilization does not constitute value for money. In [2], a particular concept of justice is brought to bear on the question. Reasoning from what w ould follow, for instance, from Daniels' concept of justice, one tries to reach a decision on this par ticular issue. However, according to Brennan's m odel, it is not possible through deductive reasoning alone to assess whether this particular employment of resources is consistent w ith the require ments of the fair equality of opportunity account. To assume that it is, testifies of a commitment to w hat is sometimes called the "engineering approach" in ethics.
In [3] , a particular concept of justice is also brought to bear on the question, b ut prim arily by com paring this case w ith other cases which are classified by the concept. The question is raised, then, to what extent in vitro fertilization is sim ilar or dissim ilar to other health care services whose public fu n d in g is far less controversial. If agreement on correct classification is reached, the case that was under scrutiny can serve as a means by w hich future cases are assessed. Thus, each process of explication contributes to the mean ing of the concept. Instead of applying one concept to the question at hand, it is equally possible to apply tw o competing concepts to a single case, thus establishing the m anner by w hich such conflicts are resolved in in d iv id u a l cases.
In [4] , the most full-fledged type o f norm ative discourse, accord ing to Brennan's model, is represented. If agreement on the correct explication of a moral principle fails to materialize, it m ay be worthwhile to examine whether its rationale w ill be of help. In the case of Daniels' principle, this w ould m ean that the wider Rawlsian concept of justice must be considered, as w ell as its contractual nature and associated assumptions. It is certainly possible that this w ill still fail to bring about agreement. However, the possibilities of normative discource w ill have been fu lly exploited.
rv. CONCLUSION
In the debate on the reform of the D utch health care system, nor mative discourse is frequently stuck at the second level. However, according to Brennan's model, nothing can be inferred from general principles unless we identify other cases w hich we believe are clas sified by the principle, and compare the case under scrutiny w ith these. This more casuistic approach has become discredited, though there are some signs of a revaluation (Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988) . Also, there is an increasing resistance to referring to w o rld views when addressing moral problems. The reason for this is that our presumed commitment to pluralism entails that incompatible world views may all be equally valid. W ould it not be naive, therefore, to hold that a reference to the rationale of a m oral principle w ould resolve our problems? I do not pretend to have answers to these intricate issues where pluralism seems to spill over into relativism.
Towards a Two Tier Health System: How to put Theory into Practice 629 W hat I do claim, however, is that the third and fourth levels of normative discourse are relatively neglected and that, up to this point, we have failed to engage in a satisfactory public debate on the desirability of the changes to which our health care system is subject. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to reconsider our methods of moral inquiry. NOTES 1 I mention separately the reimbursement arrangement which is subject to the discretionary judgment of the health care insurance company because of the rela tive autonomy companies have in their decisions, It is a possible source of geo graphical variation, although, to my knowledge, few, if any, systematic studies have been undertaken to examine this, 2 See, for example, the interesting report by Re dm ay ne and Klein on the decisions by local health care authorities to purchase in vitro fertilization.
